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Big Enough To Matter: Whether Statistical 
Significance or Practical Significance Should Be 
the Test for Title VII Disparate Impact Claims 
Elliot Ko 
Seventeen years ago, the Boston Police Department began 
testing its officers and cadets for illegal drug use.1 Less than 
one percent of the force’s officers and cadets tested positive for 
illegal drug use.2 But African-American officers and cadets 
tested positive for illegal drug use almost five times more fre-
quently than white officers and cadets.3 Ten African-American 
officers and cadets sued the Boston Police Department, arguing 
that the department’s drug testing program violated Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 The plaintiffs probably ex-
pected the police department to defend its drug testing program 
on the grounds that it was a matter of “business necessity.”5 In-
stead, this case addressed the unearthed and often-neglected 
legal question: What does “disparate impact” mean?6 
Title VII broadly proscribes the use of any employment 
practice that “causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”7 But what does “dispar-
ate impact” mean? Does it mean any disparity that is statisti-
 
  J.D., 2016, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks to 
Professor Jessica Clarke, Adam Beaupre, Kusha Mohammadi, Gregory Esco-
bar, Danielle Builta, and the Minnesota Law Review staff for their input and 
help with preparing this Note. Copyright © 2016 by Elliot Ko. 
 1. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 2. Id. at 42–43, 44. 
 3. Id. at 43. 
 4. Id. at 41. 
 5. Cf. id. at 54–55 (leaving this question “open for further considera-
tion”). 
 6. See Michael Stenger, The First Circuit Strikes Out in Jones v. City of 
Boston: A Pitch for Practical Significance in Disparate Impact Cases, 60 VILL. 
L. REV. 411, 413–14 (2015). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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cally significant, no matter how small that disparity may be?8 
Or does it refer only to a disparity that is both statistically and 
practically significant?9 Why does this matter? Statistical sig-
nificance measures the likelihood that a certain disparity is due 
to random chance instead of some other factor.10 Practical sig-
nificance, on the other hand, asks whether this disparity is 
large enough to matter in practical terms.11 In many cases, a 
disparity that is statistically significant will also be practically 
significant. But not always.12 In some cases, statistically signif-
icant disparities may “have little or no real-world im-
portance.”13 Thus, the courts’ answer to the question posed 
above can either doom or save claims with a high level of statis-
tical significance but a low level of practical significance. 
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has provided 
much guidance on this question.14 Title VII itself prohibits the 
use of any employment practice that would “adversely affect” or 
otherwise have a “disparate impact” on minorities.15 Neither 
term, however, is defined in Title VII.16 As for the Supreme 
Court, it has alternately spoken of employment practices that 
disqualify minorities at “a substantially higher rate” than non-
minority applicants;17 “significant statistical disparit[ies]”;18 and 
statistical disparities that have a “significantly different,”19 
“significantly greater,”20 or “significantly discriminatory im-
 
 8. See discussion and cases cited infra Part I.C.1. 
 9. See discussion and cases cited infra Part I.C.2. 
 10. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 11. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 12. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 13. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 14. BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW 124 (4th ed. 2007) (“The Supreme Court has variously spoken of 
‘statistical disparities . . . sufficiently substantial [to] raise an inference of cau-
sation,’ a ‘significantly different’ selection rate, and a ‘substantially dispropor-
tionate’ disqualification rate as constituting evidence of adverse impact, but it 
has given no definitive guidance on ‘just what threshold mathematical show-
ing of variance . . . suffices as a “substantial disproportionate impact.”’ . . . 
[A]nd the text of Title VII, as amended by the 1991 Act, provides no definitive 
answer.” (citations omitted)). 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), (k) (2012). 
 16. See, e.g., id. § 2000e (defining many terms, but not “adverse affect” or 
“disparate impact”). 
 17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971). 
 18. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009); Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 19. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
 20. N.Y. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 586 (1979). 
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pact”21 on minorities. At other times, the Court has spoken of 
statistical disparities that are large enough to have sufficient 
“probative value”22 or that are “sufficiently substantial” to 
“raise . . . an inference of causation.”23 In still other instances, 
the Supreme Court has cited the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission’s (EEOC) four-fifths rule (a rough proxy for 
both practical and statistical significance) and standard devia-
tion analysis (a test for statistical significance) as possible tests 
for disparate impact claims.24 What the Supreme Court has not 
done is clarify whether a “significant” disparity is one that is 
statistically significant or practically significant.25 This has led 
to a split in the lower courts on this question.26 
This Note catalogs the circuit split on this question. It also 
analyzes the text, legislative history, and judicial interpreta-
tion of Title VII to determine whether practical significance 
should be a necessary element of every disparate impact claim. 
Part I briefly summarizes the history of disparate impact 
claims, introduces the difference between statistical and practi-
cal significance, and examines each circuit’s case law on this is-
sue. Part II argues that the text of Title VII, its legislative his-
tory, and applicable Supreme Court precedent should not 
require plaintiffs to prove practical significance as part of their 
prima facie cases. Part III makes two proposals. First, courts 
should abolish the practical significance requirement as part of 
the plaintiff ’s prima facie case and adopt a rebuttable pre-
sumption that any statistically significant disparity is a “dis-
parate impact” for the purposes of Title VII disparate impact 
claims. Second, to the extent that courts still wish to retain 
practical significance as a way for a defendant to rebut the pre-
sumption that a statistically significant disparity is actionable 
under Title VII, courts should develop a more concrete test for 
measuring practical significance. 
 
 21. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). 
 22. Id. at 463 n.7. 
 23. Watson, 487 U.S. at 995. 
 24. Id. at 995 n.3. 
 25. See, e.g., id. at 995. 
 26. See infra Part I.C. 
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I.  THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS AND 
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
STATISTICAL AND PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE   
This Part explores the history of disparate impact claims, 
explains the difference between statistical and practical signifi-
cance, and surveys the existing case law on this issue. Its pur-
pose is to summarize the development of disparate impact lia-
bility from 1971 to the current day. Its purpose is also to 
explain why the distinction between statistical and practical 
significance matters in the real world and summarize the exist-
ing case law on whether practical significance is required for 
disparate impact claims. To that end, Section A briefly lays out 
the history of disparate impact theory. Section B explains the 
difference between statistical and practical significance. Final-
ly, Section C examines each circuit’s case law on this question. 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY 
Title VII, as it was originally enacted, did not contain the 
words “disparate impact.”27 It did, however, prohibit employers 
from “discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”28 
or acting in any other way “which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee.”29 Seven years after 
Title VII’s enactment, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Su-
preme Court held that this language prohibited not only inten-
tional discrimination “because” of a protected characteristic, 
but also facially neutral policies that had the effect of dispro-
portionately harming minorities.30 In other words, Title VII 
prohibits “not only overt discrimination but also practices that 
are fair in form but discriminatory in practice[],” at least if 
such practices are not justified by “business necessity.”31 The 
 
 27. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) (containing no subsection (k), six years after Title VII 
was originally enacted). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 29. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
 31. Id. at 431. If the challenged employment practice is “absolutely essen-
tial to the operation” of the business, the employer may assert this as an af-
firmative defense to Title VII liability. Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the 
Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding 
the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (1996). 
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first type of claim came to be known as a “disparate treatment” 
claim, whereas the second was called a “disparate impact” 
claim.32 A disparate treatment claim is appropriate when an 
employer intentionally discriminates against an applicant or an 
employee because of her race, sex, or religion.33 A disparate im-
pact claim, on the other hand, is appropriate when an employer 
adopts a facially neutral practice that disproportionately harms 
members of a protected class, even if the employer had no ill in-
tent or animus towards members of that class.34 
Seventeen years after Griggs, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio,35 the Supreme Court “significantly” cut back the scope 
of disparate impact claims in three ways.36 First, the Court im-
posed a “causation requirement,” requiring the plaintiff to show 
as part of his prima facie case that the statistical disparity 
complained of was the “result” of one or more specific employ-
ment practices.37 Second, the Court lowered the standard for 
the employer’s affirmative defense, allowing employers to rebut 
a disparate impact claim by simply pointing to a “legitimate 
business justification” for the challenged employment prac-
tice.38 Third, the Court held that the employer only bore the 
burden of production, and not the burden of persuasion, on its 
business justification defense.39 
This regime only lasted two years. In 1991, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.40 This Act did three things. 
First, the Act implicitly ratified the viability of disparate im-
pact theory by stating that an unlawful employment practice 
 
 32. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining the 
difference between these two types of claims). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recog-
nized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 36. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the impact 
of Wards Cove). 
 37. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. 
 38. See id. at 659 (“[A]t the justification stage of . . . a disparate-impact 
case, the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a signifi-
cant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer . . . . [T]here is no 
requirement that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the 
employer’s business for it to pass muster . . . .”). 
 39. See id. at 659–60. 
 40. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
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could be “based on disparate impact.”41 Second, the Act partial-
ly codified Wards Cove’s first holding by requiring the plaintiff 
to prove that “a particular employment practice . . . cause[d] a 
disparate impact,”42 unless “the elements of a respondent’s de-
cision making process are not capable of separation for analy-
sis.”43 Third, the Act abrogated the last two holdings of Wards 
Cove and restored pre-Wards Cove case law on the business ne-
cessity defense by putting the burden of proof on the employer 
to prove that a challenged employment practice was “consistent 
with business necessity.”44 
More recently, the Supreme Court has extended disparate 
impact theory to two other anti-discrimination statutes: the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196745 and the Fair 
Housing Act.46 
B. STATISTICAL VS. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: TWO DIFFERENT 
THINGS 
This Section attempts to explain the difference between 
statistical and practical significance. Even though statistical 
and practical significance are two different things, many courts 
do not analyze these concepts separately.47 To make matters 
worse, there is little consensus on how to measure these two 
different concepts, if they are required in the first place.48 Sub-
section 1 explains what statistical significance means and how 
to measure it. Subsection 2 does the same for practical signifi-
cance. Subsection 3 discusses when the difference between sta-
 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 624 
(describing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as “formally codif[ying] the disparate-
impact component of Title VII”). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 43. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (reiterating Wards 
Cove’s causation requirement and describing Wards Cove as “superseded by 
statute on other grounds”). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 45. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235–38 (2005). 
 46. See Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525. 
 47. See cases cited infra Part I.C. This imprecision is also common in the 
academic literature. See, e.g., Scott W. McKinley, The Need for Legislative or 
Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and How Employers in the Sixth Cir-
cuit Can Survive the Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171 (2008) (discussing both 
the four-fifths rule and various ways to measure statistical significance with-
out distinguishing between statistical and practical significance). 
 48. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2. 
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tistical and practical significance might actually matter in a re-
al-world case. 
1. Statistical Significance 
Broadly speaking, statistical significance attempts to 
measure the likelihood that a statistical disparity is attributa-
ble to something more than chance.49 To ask whether a certain 
employment practice adversely affects a protected class in a 
statistically significant way is another way of asking whether 
there is some “relationship” between “the challenged employ-
ment practice” and membership in a protected class.50 Some 
courts have referred to statistical significance as an “indication 
of causation.”51 Statistical analysis, however, can never “conclu-
sively establish the cause . . . for an observed disparity.”52 At 
best, it can suggest that it is highly unlikely that a certain ad-
verse impact on a protected class is due solely to chance.53 
Statisticians use a variety of tests to measure statistical 
significance.54 The relative merits of these tests is beyond the 
scope of this Note,55 as are the precise details of how to conduct 
these tests.56 That said, a basic understanding of some of the 
terms used in this field may be helpful for understanding what 
courts mean when they use certain statistical terms. Three 
terms bear special mention here: (a) p-values; (b) confidence in-
tervals; and (c) standard deviations. 
 
 49. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2014); STEPHANIE R. 
THOMAS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE IMPACT: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE 25 (2011). 
 50. THOMAS, supra note 49, at 44–45. 
 51. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 40 (2011); see also 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994–95 (1988) (correlating 
statistical testing with the causation requirement of Title VII). 
 52. THOMAS, supra note 49, at 63. 
 53. Id. at 25. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 41–61 (describing binomial distribution analysis, 
hypergeometric distribution analysis, the Chi Square Test, Fisher’s Exact 
Test, the Mantel-Haenszel Test, and logistic regression analysis as just a few 
of the most commonly used statistical tools for examining adverse impact). 
The EEOC’s “four-fifths rule” is also sometimes used as a rough proxy for 
measuring both statistical and practical significance. 
 55. See id. at 46 (stating that “[c]hoosing the appropriate test depends up-
on the nature of the selection process,” and, among other things, whether 
there are a “variable number of selections” or a “fixed number of selections”). 
 56. See generally DAVID COPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
(2005) (providing an introduction to statistical analysis for lawyers). 
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a. P-Values 
Statisticians can “calculate the probability of observing a 
difference equal to or greater than that which actually oc-
curred, assuming equal opportunity.”57 This probability is called 
the “p-value,” and by convention, studies with “p-values” of less 
than 5% are generally considered “statistically significant.”58 In 
other words, if the likelihood of a certain disparity occurring by 
chance (i.e., the “null hypothesis”) is less than 5%, then a “ma-
jority of scientific journals (and courts)” will deem that dispari-
ty to be statistically significant.59 
That said, the selection of the “alpha level” (the number 
that the “p-value” has to equal or less for the study to be con-
sidered statistically significant) is somewhat arbitrary.60 Some 
researchers have therefore moved towards reporting the “spe-
cific probability (p) of getting a particular result.”61 Instead of 
saying that a certain disparity is “significant at the 0.05 level,” 
these researchers might specify that “p = 0.016,” allowing “the 
consumer of the data to decide the significance” of the data in 
question.62 
b. Confidence Intervals 
Alternatively, statisticians can measure the probability 
that the “true value” of a parameter lies within a certain “range 
of values.”63 This probability is usually referred to as a “confi-
dence interval,” the “margin of error,” or an “interval esti-
mate.”64 Confidence intervals are “often used” instead of (or in 
addition to) p-values to measure statistical significance.65 A 
 
 57. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 58. Id. 
 59. COPE, supra note 56, at 40. 
 60. See id. (“[N]othing in the definition of statistical significance singles 
out 0.05 as the level that must be met for the null hypothesis to be rejected.”). 
Multiple regression analysis also requires analysts to choose which variables 
to include in their equations. This can add another element of subjectivity into 
the process. See D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 545 (2008). 
 61. COPE, supra note 56, at 41 n.10. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 48. 
 64. Cf. id. (using the term “interval estimate”). 
 65. Wayne W. LaMorte, Random Error: Confidence Intervals and p-
Values, BOS. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH 
-Modules/EP/EP713_RandomError/EP713_RandomError6.html (last modified 
June 6, 2016). 
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95% cutoff point for statistical significance is common for confi-
dence intervals.66 Expressed in statistical terms, “if the null 
value is not contained within the 95% confidence interval, then 
the probability that the null is the true value is less than 5%.”67 
This means the corresponding p-value “must be [less than] 
0.05,” and the documented disparity is likely statistically sig-
nificant.68 
c. Standard Deviations 
Standard deviations are a measure of how much a certain 
result differs from the mean of the relevant data set. For exam-
ple, if a 5’6” height requirement for firefighter applicants would 
exclude 90% of female applicants but only 10% of all applicants, 
the distance between those two numbers (90% and 10%) could 
be measured in terms of standard deviations. There is a rough 
correlation between standard deviations and confidence inter-
vals, with two standard deviations “roughly correspond[ing] to 
a [95%] confidence interval, meaning that there is a [5%] 
chance that the disparity is random,” whereas “three standard 
deviations corresponds to roughly a 99.75% confidence interval, 
meaning that there is a 0.25% chance that the disparity is ran-
dom.”69 In the Title VII context, a disparity may usually be con-
sidered “statistically significant when it is more than two or 
three standard deviations from the expected rates.”70 
Again, the details and respective merits of different tests 
for measuring statistical significance are beyond the scope of 
this Note. It is enough to observe that each of these tests seeks 
to calculate the likelihood that a certain disparity is due to 
something more than chance. At the same time, each of these 
tests requires the arbitrary selection of a certain value. Statis-
tical significance is really not a yes/no proposition so much as it 
is a range in which statisticians can calculate their respective 
confidence that a certain result is due to more than chance.71 To 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate 
Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 786 (2009). 
 70. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 
n.14 (1977)); see also Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 908 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(noting that Hazelwood’s standard deviation test is commonly used for dispar-
ate impact claims). 
 71. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
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express that certainty as a yes/no proposition requires the arbi-
trary selection of a certain value, below or above which the re-
sult can be deemed “statistically significant.” 
2. Practical Significance 
Unlike statistical significance, practical significance 
measures the “real-world importance” of a statistical dispari-
ty.72 In other words, practical significance asks whether a cer-
tain disparity is large enough to matter.73 If the size of the dis-
parity is “negligible,” “practical significance is lacking.”74 
Practical significance, like statistical significance, can be meas-
ured in many ways. Two bear mention here: (a) the EEOC’s 
four-fifths rule and (b) the “case-by-case” analysis method. 
a. The EEOC’s Four-Fifths Rule 
One method75 for measuring practical significance is the 
EEOC’s “four-fifths rule,” which states that “[a] selection rate 
for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths 
. . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally 
be regarded by the federal enforcement agencies as evidence of 
adverse impact.”76 Unfortunately, the four-fifths rule is not 
clear on whether its reference to the “selection rate” for any 
group refers to the firing rate or retention rate for that group.77 
 
 72. COPE, supra note 56, at 52–54. 
 73. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing the 
practical significance inquiry as asking whether a disparity “is sufficiently 
large” instead of asking whether that disparity “is nonrandom”); see also 
THOMAS, supra note 49, at 25 (describing the practical significance inquiry as 
an “additional question” that asks whether an “observed difference[ ]” is “big 
enough to be important from a practical perspective”). 
 74. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
252 (3d ed. 2011). That said, in some fields, even “very small differences . . . 
can be of enormous significance” if the consequence of the disparity is signifi-
cant, or if a very large sample size is involved, such that even a 0.1% differ-
ence might affect thousands of people. COPE, supra note 56, at 52–54. 
 75. As noted above, the four-fifths rule can be used as a rough measure of 
both statistical and practical significance. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 47, 
at 185 (describing the four-fifths rule as one of several ways to show statistical 
significance). 
 76. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015); see also McKinley, supra note 47, at 177–
78 (giving an example of how the four-fifths rule can be applied in practice). 
 77. See, e.g., Jones, 752 F.3d at 51–52 (explaining how this ambiguity can 
lead to conflicting conclusions even with the same data); Council 31, Am. Fed’n 
of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(giving one example of this problem). 
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This “often leads to inconsistent application of the rule.”78 Many 
circuits have rejected mechanical application of the EEOC’s 
four-fifths rule, but some still use it as a rough rule of thumb.79 
b. The Case-by-Case Approach 
Those courts that have rejected mechanical application of 
the EEOC’s four-fifth rules often phrase the practical signifi-
cance test as an analysis of whether a certain disparity is “sig-
nificant” enough to matter.80 These courts largely do not distin-
guish between statistical significance and practical 
significance.81 Phrased this way, the practical significance in-
quiry can take into account not just the quantitative size of the 
impact, but the “qualitative nature and weight” of its impact.82 
For example, if a police department with 500 black officers and 
1200 white officers “implements a policy leading to the termi-
nation of [ninety] black officers and no white officers,” the court 
might well determine that this disparity is practically signifi-
cant, even if the retention rate of black officers (82%) is more 
than four-fifths of the retention rate of white officers (100%).83 
Similarly, a court might distinguish between an employment 
practice that leads to the firing of one of six black employees 
and a practice that leads to the firing of 100 of 600 black em-
ployees, even though these two situations would be treated 
identically under the EEOC’s four-fifths rule.84 Those courts 
that have rejected mechanical application of the EEOC’s four-
fifths rule often stress the flexible, fact-dependent nature of 
their alternative analysis.85 Either way, practical significance is 
not a precise or purely mathematical concept.86 Instead, it in-
 
 78. Stenger, supra note 6, at 423 n.71. 
 79. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 47, at 182–85 (describing the split 
among circuit courts regarding how much deference should be given to the 
four-fifths rule); Stenger, supra note 6, at 422 n.65 (collecting a few cases). 
 80. See cases cited infra Part I.C.1. 
 81. See cases cited infra Part I.C.1. 
 82. Jones, 752 F.3d at 52 (citing Steve Goodman, The Dirty Dozen: Twelve 
P-Value Misconceptions, 45 SEMINARS IN HEMATOLOGY 135, 136–37 (2008)). 
 83. Id. at 51. 
 84. Id. at 52. 
 85. See, e.g., Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 
(2d Cir. 1991) (“Courts should take a ‘case-by-case approach’ in judging the 
significance or substantiality of disparities, one that considers not only statis-
tics but also all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” (citing Ottaviani v. 
State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 372–73 (2d Cir. 1989))); see 
also cases cited infra Part I.C.1. 
 86. Jones, 752 F.3d at 50 (observing that “the concept of practical signifi-
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vites social, legal, and common sense determinations about 
whether a certain disparity ought to be large enough to result 
in liability for a given employer.87 
3. Statistical vs. Practical Significance: Why This Distinction 
Matters 
Statistical and practical significance often go together, but 
not always. As the American Statistical Association explains: 
Statistical significance is not equivalent to scientific, human, or eco-
nomic significance. Smaller p-values do not necessarily imply the 
presence of larger or more important effects, and larger p-values do 
not imply a lack of importance or even lack of effect. Any effect, no 
matter how tiny, can produce a small p-value if the sample size or 
measurement precision is high enough . . . .88 
In other words, with a good study, “even very small differ-
ences can be statistically significant.”89 This is especially com-
mon in studies with “large sample sizes,” where the greater 
amount of available data decreases the likelihood that a certain 
disparity is simply due to chance.90 For example, in Jones v. 
City of Boston, the challenged employment practice (a drug 
testing policy) adversely affected 1.3% of African-American of-
ficers and cadets and 0.3% of white officers and cadets.91 Over 
eight years, this employment practice disqualified 55 out of 
4222 African-American officers and cadets but only 30 out of 
10,835 white officers and cadets.92 This sample size was large 
enough to yield a statistical disparity that corresponded to a 
standard deviation of 7.14 from the expected mean.93 This dis-
parity was statistically significant.94 The police department ar-
gued, however, that the difference between 0.3% and 1.3% was 
not practically significant because very few blacks or whites 
 
cance is impossible to define in even a remotely precise manner,” as there is no 
generally accepted “objective measure of practical significance”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Am. Statistical Assoc. Bd. of Dirs., ASA Statement on Statistical Sig-
nificance and P-Values, AM. STATISTICIAN, June 9, 2016, at 132. 
 89. Jones, 752 F.3d at 49. 
 90. Id. at 53; cf. Stenger, supra note 6, at 420–21 (noting that courts will 
generally allow plaintiffs to “aggregate data from numerous years in order to 
make their proffered sample statistically significant” but may “question[ ] the 
viability of aggregation by scrutinizing its probative value in light of other 
considerations”). 
 91. Jones, 752 F.3d at 41. 
 92. Id. at 44. 
 93. Id. at 45. 
 94. Id. at 43–44. 
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failed the drug test policy.95 The result in Jones thus turned on 
whether the plaintiffs had to prove both statistical and practi-
cal significance as part of their prima facie disparate impact 
case.96 
Jones is just one example of a case where statistical signifi-
cance does not necessarily equate to practical significance. The 
next Section of this Note collects cases from several circuits 
that have required practical significance separately from statis-
tical significance. 
C. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
The courts are split on whether to define “disparate im-
pact” in terms of statistical or practical significance. A few cir-
cuits have tackled this issue head-on and come down on oppo-
site sides of the debate. Other circuits have used language that 
only inferentially suggests that they may or may not require a 
showing of practical significance separately from statistical 
significance. Other circuits do not appear to distinguish be-
tween statistical and practical significance at all. This Section 
summarizes the existing case law from all twelve circuits on 
this issue. Subsection 1 discusses precedents from six circuits 
that require something more than statistical significance for 
disparate impact claims. Subsection 2 discusses the three cir-
cuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. Subsection 3 
discusses case law from three circuits that have yet to weigh in 
on this issue. 
1. Circuits Requiring a Showing of Practical Significance 
Six circuits—the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh—take a holistic approach to disparate impact claims, 
considering both statistical and practical significance. All of 
these circuits have indicated that something more than statis-
tical significance may be required for disparate impact claims 
in some cases. 
 
 95. See id. at 42 (“A very small percentage of officers and cadets, either 
white or black, tested positive for cocaine during the period covered by this 
lawsuit.”); id. at 48–49 (summarizing the defendant’s practical significance 
argument). More specifically, only 55 out of 4222 African-American officers 
and 30 out of 10,835 white officers tested positive for cocaine in the eight-year 
period that was covered by the lawsuit. Id. at 45. 
 96. Compare id. at 46–48 (concluding that there was no genuine dispute 
that the statistical disparity was statistically significant), with id. at 48–53 
(declining to adopt an additional practical significance requirement). 
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The Second Circuit has concluded that “[c]ourts should 
take a ‘case-by-case approach’ in judging the significance or 
substantiality of disparities, one that considers not only statis-
tics but also all the surrounding facts and circumstances.”97 
Even a statistically significant disparity may not be sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact if that dis-
parity is of “limited magnitude” (meaning that the actual size of 
the disparity is relatively small).98 A more recent case from the 
Second Circuit focuses on statistical significance but quotes ap-
provingly the portion of Waisome that discusses using a “case-
by-case approach” to statistics.99 
In the same way, the Fourth Circuit has also noted that 
statistical significance “is not always synonymous with legal 
significance.”100 Statistical disparities that are greater than two 
standard deviations are generally considered statistically sig-
nificant.101 But the usefulness of statistical evidence “depends 
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.”102 Thus, 
even though statistical significance is an important part of dis-
parate impact theory,103 it is not always a sufficient predicate 
for a disparate impact claim. 
The Fifth Circuit has taken a similar approach. In one 
case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment 
for the defendant, even where the difference between the ex-
 
 97. Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 
1991) (citing Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 372–
73 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 153 (2d Cir. 2012); see 
also Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2015) (con-
cluding that a § 1981 or Equal Protection case could be “based on statistics 
alone, [but] the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the 
mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausi-
ble non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely”). 
 100. Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 908 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
the two-standard deviation test is the most common statistical test for meas-
uring disparate impact). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
340 (1977)). Teamsters, however, was a systemic disparate treatment case, so 
courts should not assume that every disparate impact case will also require 
the same level of buttressing anecdotal evidence. 
 103. See Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 336 & n.17 (4th 
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat’l, 615 F.2d 147, 151–53 
(4th Cir. 1980); Vanguard Justice Soc., Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 698 
(D. Md. 1979), decision supplemented, 592 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1984) (refer-
ring to a “statistical showing of a significant discrepancy”). 
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pected and actual pass rates for a minority group equated to 
3.93 standard deviations.104 This difference would typically be 
considered statistically significant under the standard devia-
tion test discussed above, but the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the “7.1% selection differential between black and white appli-
cants” was not large enough to support a disparate impact 
claim.105 In another case, the Fifth Circuit suggested that it 
might not be enough for there to be “a statistically significant 
correlation between test scores and experimental ratings” if 
“that . . . correlation [was] of very low magnitude and lack[ed] 
practical significance.”106 The Fifth Circuit also noted in dicta 
that the EEOC’s regulations required a showing of “[p]ractical 
or operational significance,”107 not just statistical significance. 
The Sixth Circuit has also suggested that a showing of 
practical significance may be required in some cases. In Isabel 
v. City of Memphis, the Sixth Circuit rejected strict adherence 
to the EEOC’s four-fifths rule and advocated for a case-by-case 
approach to statistical analysis.108 In doing so, it quoted with 
approval the portion of the EEOC regulation that “[s]maller dif-
ferences in selection rate may nonetheless constitute adverse 
impact, where they are significant in both statistical and prac-
tical terms . . . .”109 Even the dissent in this case appeared to as-
sume that any statistical disparity had to be significant in both 
statistical and practical terms.110 
The Ninth Circuit’s position on this question is unclear, but 
two of its cases have looked to both statistical and practical 
significance to determine whether a disparate impact claim can 
 
 104. Moore v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam). The 3.93 standard deviations figure is not from Moore itself, but from 
a district court opinion summarizing Moore. See Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of 
Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1991). 
 105. Moore, 593 F.2d at 608. 
 106. Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980); see also Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. 
Co., 613 F.2d 527, 545 (5th Cir. 1980) (making a similar observation in anoth-
er case). 
 107. Ensley, 616 F.2d at 818 n.15; cf. Moore, 593 F.2d at 608 & n.1 (con-
cluding that a 7.1% selection differential was not large enough to qualify as a 
“substantially disproportionate impact,” as was required to make out an ad-
verse impact claim). 
 108. Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 109. Id. at 412 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015)). 
 110. Id. at 418 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (“[T]he . . . statistical evidence 
. . . , while statistically significant, does not rise to the level of a Title VII in-
fraction.”). 
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go forward.111 Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit seems to have 
left open the possibility of some sort of hybrid test allowing 
courts to look at both statistical and practical significance, but 
without making either one a strict prerequisite for establishing 
a disparate impact claim.112 
Since the Eleventh Circuit split off from the Fifth Circuit 
in 1981, Fifth Circuit cases decided before that year (including 
the Moore and Ensley decisions discussed above) are binding in 
the Eleventh Circuit.113 Later cases from the Eleventh Circuit 
have also drawn a distinction between statistical and practical 
significance and required proof of both for disparate impact 
claims.114  
2. Circuits That Do Not Require a Showing of Practical 
Significance 
Three circuits—the First, Third, and Tenth—have taken a 
contrary position. These circuits only require a showing of sta-
tistical significance, and not practical significance. 
The First Circuit recently held that “a plaintiff ’s failure to 
demonstrate practical significance cannot preclude that plain-
tiff from relying on competent evidence of statistical signifi-
cance to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.”115 It 
reached this decision after criticizing the four-fifths rule at 
some length and observing that, apart from the four-fifths rule, 
it knew of “no statute, regulation, or case law proposing any 
other mathematical measure of practical significance.”116 
The Third Circuit has also definitively rejected the practi-
cal significance requirement. In Stagi v. National Railroad 
 
 111. See Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 515–16, 516 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2002); Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1428–29 (9th Cir. 1985); 
cf. Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., No 80-436 FR, 1985 WL 25631, at 
*34 (D. Or. Feb. 13, 1985), aff ’d, 816 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing 
between statistical and practical significance in evaluating a systemic dispar-
ate treatment claim). 
 112. Cf. Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 528 (arguing that even if the defendant 
“didn’t understand statistical significance, he would have had to see from the 
practical effect of the raises that he was causing . . . discrimination”). 
 113. Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058, 1059 n.3 (1985) (citing Bonner v. City of 
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)); Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 
872 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 114. See, e.g., Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1555 
(11th Cir. 1994); Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1527–28 
(M.D. Ala. 1991). 
 115. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 116. Jones, 752 F.3d at 52. 
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Passenger Corp., the Third Circuit asserted: “We can identify 
no Court of Appeals that has found ‘practical significance’ to be 
a requirement for a plaintiff ’s prima facie case of disparate im-
pact . . . .”117 Then, after dismissing the reference to practical 
significance in the EEOC’s four-fifths rule, the Third Circuit 
concluded that because “‘practical’ significance has not been 
adopted by our Court, and no other Court of Appeals requires a 
showing of practical significance, we decline to require such a 
showing as part of a plaintiff ’s prima facie case.”118 Consistent 
with this rule, a more recent decision from the Third Circuit 
used only standard deviation analysis—a test for statistical 
significance—to determine whether a plaintiff had established 
a prima facie disparate impact claim.119 
The Tenth Circuit has also declined to adopt a practical 
significance requirement, but only in a case involving the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In Apsley v. Boeing 
Co., the Tenth Circuit observed that the defendant had “cite[d] 
no cases supporting a formal ‘practical significance’ require-
ment at the summary judgment stage.”120 The Tenth Circuit 
conceded that even very small disparities could be statistically 
significant with large sample sizes but stressed that the “ob-
served [employment] disparity persisted over the course of 
eight or nine thousand individual recommendations and of-
fers.”121 Even though Apsley was an ADEA case, if anything, the 
permissible scope of disparate impact claims under Title VII is 
broader than the scope of similar claims under the ADEA.122 
 
 117. Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 139 (3d Cir. 
2010). The accuracy of this statement is somewhat questionable in light of the 
cases discussed above, but perhaps the Third Circuit was only counting cir-
cuits that have explicitly adopted a practical significance requirement, without 
counting circuits that have adopted a more holistic approach that evaluates 
both statistical and practical significance. 
 118. Id. at 140. 
 119. Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 372 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 120. Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 1184, 1199 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 121. Id. On the other hand, even though the Tenth Circuit may have disa-
greed with some of the district court’s reasoning, it affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiffs failed to 
prove a “systemwide pattern or practice” of discrimination. Id. at 1200. The 
plaintiffs’ evidence indicated, at best, that the defendants might have engaged 
in “isolated or sporadic instances of . . . discrimination.” Id. 
 122. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). 
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3. Circuits Without Clear Precedent on the Need for Practical 
Significance 
Three circuits—the D.C., Seventh, and Eighth Circuits—
have not clearly indicated whether proof of practical signifi-
cance should be required for disparate impact claims. 
A dissenting D.C. Circuit judge once pointed out that “sta-
tistical significance is not the same as practical significance be-
cause in isolation . . . [statistical significance] tells nothing 
about the importance or magnitude of the differences.”123 But 
this was a passing comment in a Federal Communications 
Commission case.124 In the Title VII context, at least three dis-
trict court opinions from the D.C. Circuit have focused on sta-
tistical significance, rather than practical significance, to eval-
uate the sufficiency of disparate impact claims.125 
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly used standard devia-
tion analysis to determine whether a certain disparity is statis-
tically significant.126 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit 
has encouraged courts to avoid using the two-to-three standard 
deviations test as a bright line test, leaving open the applica-
tion of some sort of practical significance test.127 And at least 
one district court case from the Seventh Circuit has argued for 
a more thorough and holistic approach for evaluating both sta-
tistical and practical significance.128 
 
 123. Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 
642 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Robinson, J., dissenting in part). 
 124. Id. The main question in this case was whether the FCC had a duty to 
give two minority associations a hearing to challenge the FCC’s renewal of the 
broadcast licenses for two radio stations that allegedly discriminated against 
racial minorities. See id. at 624. Furthermore, this D.C. Circuit judge made 
this comment only after noting that the FCC could “employ standards different 
from those utilized by the EEOC in carrying out its mandate” because the 
FCC’s main concern was with “intentional discrimination,” whereas the EEOC 
was “chartered to search out and remedy both discriminatory intent and dis-
criminatory effect.” Id. at 642 (emphasis added). 
 125. See Delgado v. Ashcroft, No. 99-2311 (JR), 2003 WL 24051558, at *8 
(D.D.C. May 29, 2003); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F. Supp. 1054, 1063 
(D.D.C. 1992); Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 
966–67 (D.D.C. 1980), aff ’d, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1981). What these cases 
did not clarify is whether a showing of statistical significance is a sufficient, 
necessary, or just possible element of a disparate impact claim. 
 126. See, e.g., Bew v. City of Chicago, 252 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 426–27 (7th Cir. 2000); Coates 
v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 536–40 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 127. Coates, 765 F.2d at 537 n.11, 547 n.22 (quoting EEOC v. Am. Nat’l. 
Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1192 (4th Cir. 1981)). 
 128. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–88 (N.D. 
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The Eighth Circuit has also used standard deviation anal-
ysis to evaluate the sufficiency of disparate impact claims.129 It 
has stated that “[a] difference of two or three standard devia-
tions is statistically significant at the [5%] significance level” 
and observed that a difference of 5.5 standard deviations (cor-
responding with a pass rate of 98% of whites but only 84% of 
blacks) is “highly unlikely” to be “due to chance.”130 On the oth-
er hand, in another part of its opinion, it concluded that this 
difference in admission rates was “significant in both statistical 
and practical terms,” suggesting that it might be using stand-
ard deviation analysis in conjunction with the actual disparity 
of admitted students to establish both statistical and practical 
significance.131 
*** 
Disparate impact claims require proof that a certain em-
ployment practice has a “disparate impact” on members of a 
protected class.132 Statistical significance is a test for determin-
ing whether a statistical disparity is due to something more 
than random chance.133 Practical significance is a test for de-
termining whether that disparity is large enough to have real-
world importance.134 Most disparities that are statistically sig-
nificant will also be practically significant, but not always.135 
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has clarified whether 
Title VII requires plaintiffs to prove that a certain employment 
practice disproportionately affects members of a protected class 
in a way that is both statistically and practically significant, or 
just the former.136 This has created a split among the circuits on 
this issue.137 
 
Ill. 1986), aff ’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 129. Hameed v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Work-
ers, Local Union No. 396, 637 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 130. Id. at 513–14. 
 131. Id. at 514. 
 132. See supra Part I.A. 
 133. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 134. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 135. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 136. See supra Part I.C. 
 137. See supra Part I.C. 
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II.  PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PRACTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE STANDARD   
This Part argues that practical significance should not be 
required for disparate impact claims. It makes both legal and 
practical arguments against the adoption of the practical signif-
icance standard. Section A explains how the ordinary meaning 
of the words “disparate” and “impact” in Title VII can refer to 
any statistically significant disparity, no matter how small. 
Section B notes the inconclusiveness of the legislative history 
on this issue. Section C explains why past Supreme Court prec-
edents need not be interpreted as requiring a practical signifi-
cance requirement. Section D argues that the EEOC’s implicit 
endorsement of the practical significance requirement should 
not receive controlling deference from the courts. Section E 
suggests that practical significance should not be required for 
disparate impact claims because practical significance is basi-
cally a test for proximate causation—a requirement lacking 
from the actual text of Title VII. Finally, Section F argues that 
the current formulation of the practical significance test is 
problematic because it is so amorphous as to be essentially ar-
bitrary. 
A. THE TEXT DOES NOT SUPPORT A PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
STANDARD 
Title VII does not define the term “disparate impact.”138 
Even so, the text of Title VII is instructive in several ways. 
First, courts may look to the common dictionary definition 
of a statutory term when that term is not separately defined in 
the statute.139 Here, courts must decide whether the term “dis-
parate impact” refers to any difference in how an employment 
practice affects a protected class, or only a large difference in 
how the employment practice affects that class. 
On one hand, several dictionaries define the word “dispar-
ate” as meaning “[f]undamentally distinct or different in 
kind,”140 “entirely dissimilar,”141 “markedly distinct in quality or 
 
 138. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (defining many other terms, but not “dis-
parate impact”). 
 139. Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 783 (2010) (“[W]e may look to diction-
aries . . . to determine the meaning of words the Code does not define . . . .”). 
 140. Disparate, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2015). 
 141. Id. 
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character,”142 or “essentially different or diverse in kind.”143 Ox-
ford’s English Dictionary gives this example of how the word 
can be used: “As remote in their nature . . . as any two dispar-
ate things we can propose or conceive . . . .”144 Arguably, then, 
even statistically significant differences may not be “disparate” 
impacts under Title VII if they are so small that they are not 
“markedly” “distinct in quality or character.” 
On the other hand, Oxford’s English Dictionary also de-
fines “disparate” as meaning “essentially different,” “dissimi-
lar,” “unlike,” “distinct,” or “unequal.”145 It also gives several 
examples where authors have referred to two things that are 
“utterly” or “very” disparate.146 If the word “disparate,” standing 
alone, only encompassed large or extreme differences between 
two things, it would be redundant to qualify it with the adverbs 
“utterly” or “very.” Arguably, then, the word “disparate” refers 
to any statistically significant disparity of any size. 
Second, courts generally should not read into a statute ad-
ditional requirements that Congress has not itself placed in the 
statute.147 Title VII does not require plaintiffs to prove that an 
employment practice had a “large” impact on a protected 
class.148 Title VII just requires plaintiffs to prove that “a partic-
ular employment practice” had a disparate impact149 on a pro-
tected class. Thus, courts should not read an additional magni-
tude requirement into Title VII’s disparate impact claims. 
Title VII only requires proof of a “disparate impact,” not 
proof of a “very” disparate impact that is large enough to war-
rant societal or moral condemnation. Thus, any time a chal-
lenged employment practice impacts a protected class more 
harshly than a non-protected class, that should be enough to 
establish a Title VII violation, whether the challenged employ-
ment practice affects the protected class in a small or large 
way. 
 
 142. Disparate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/disparate (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 143. Disparate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/54914?redirectedFrom=disparate#eid (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 144. Id. (quoting 2 THOMAS BURNET, THE SACRED THEORY OF THE EARTH 
302 (1719)). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003). 
 148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012). 
 149. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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At this point, proponents of a practical significance re-
quirement may argue that the preceding argument proves too 
much. To be consistent, they might say, the preceding argu-
ment would also require abolition of the statistical significance 
requirement. If the smallest disparity is enough to establish a 
Title VII violation, does that mean even a statistically insignif-
icant disparity should be enough to support a disparate impact 
claim? Not necessarily, because the statistical significance re-
quirement, unlike the practical significance requirement, is 
grounded in a different part of the text. In expounding a stat-
ute, courts must “look to the provisions of the whole law,”150 
keeping in mind that “a word is known by the company it 
keeps.”151 In this case, Title VII requires plaintiffs to prove that 
a particular employment practice “cause[d] a disparate impact” 
on the basis of a protected characteristic.152 Statistical signifi-
cance, unlike practical significance, is at least inferentially re-
lated to causation.153 
For these reasons, although the text of Title VII is some-
what ambiguous, the better view is to read the text as requiring 
only a showing of statistical significance. Disparate impact 
plaintiffs should only have to prove that the challenged em-
ployment practice had “a” disparate impact on a protected 
class, however small. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT SUPPORT A PRACTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE STANDARD 
The legislative history for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is in-
conclusive. But it contains three statements that suggest that 
Title VII’s disparate impact provisions were originally intended 
to only require a showing of statistical significance. 
First, during the debate on the original Civil Rights Act of 
1964, a senator read from an article which quoted an expert 
statistician as saying that a variance of 2.2% between the pas-
sage rate of minorities and non-minorities was “not statistically 
significant,” but a “variance of 6[%]. . . could be considered sig-
nificant.”154 Neither this senator nor any other senator made 
 
 150. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)). 
 151. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995). 
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 
 153. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2. 
 154. 110 CONG. REC. 9041 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Tower). 
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any reference to any additional requirement of “practical signif-
icance.” 
Second, in a Senate committee hearing for the Civil Rights 
Act of 1990 (an early precursor to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
that was ultimately enacted into law), a labor economist noted 
that “even a statistically significant disparity” between the em-
ployment rates of minorities and non-minorities might not 
“constitute[] conclusive evidence of race . . . discrimination by 
that employer.”155 He explained that “statistical significance” 
only measured whether a disparity was “due to something oth-
er than pure ‘chance,’” but “even if the hypothetical disparity 
were found to be ‘statistically significant,’” this did “not mean 
that the disparity [was] necessarily due to discrimination.”156 
These statements apparently assumed that statistical signifi-
cance was the relevant test for disparate impact claims.157 
Third, during a House subcommittee hearing for the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, a lawyer and former commissioner of the 
EEOC suggested that the term “disparate impact” should be 
defined in terms of statistical significance.158 She said the fol-
lowing: 
Although . . . [the Civil Rights Act of 1991] does not contain a defini-
tion as to what “disparate impact” is, I would hope that the Commit-
tee would consider using the definitions previously used by the Su-
preme Court to limit the term by applying standards of statistical 
significance of two or three standard deviations . . . .159 
Again, as discussed above, standard deviations are a 
measure of statistical significance (i.e., statistical correlation), 
not practical significance.160 
All three of these statements referred specifically to statis-
tical significance. Read together, they suggest that Congress 
understood the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to only require the 
plaintiff to prove that a certain employment practice had a sta-
 
 155. Hearing on S. 2104 Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 
101st Cong. 298 (1990) (statement of Paul J. Andrisani, Professor, Human Re-
source Management, Temple University). 
 156. Id. at 299. 
 157. See id. at 298. 
 158. Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional 
Rights, 102d Cong. 158–59 (statement of Cathie A. Shattuck, Partner, Ep-
stein, Becker & Green, P.C.). 
 159. Id. Shattuck also made a passing reference to the EEOC’s four-fifths 
rule in her testimony. But that reference is not inconsistent with an implicit 
endorsement of a statistical significance standard because the EEOC’s four-
fifths rule can be used as a rough proxy for statistical or practical significance. 
 160. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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tistically significant disparate impact on members of a protect-
ed class. 
C. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT SUPPORT A 
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE STANDARD 
The Supreme Court has never clearly specified “just what 
threshold mathematical showing of variance” is required for 
disparate impact claims.161 Its precedents, however, do not 
clearly support a practical significance standard requirement 
for two reasons. 
First, Griggs itself does not require any showing of practi-
cal significance. Rather, it broadly prohibits the use of any em-
ployment practice “which operates to exclude” minorities.162 An 
employment practice that results in a statistically significant 
disparity “operates to exclude” minorities, whether it only ex-
cludes one or a million minority employees.163 Thus, Griggs 
suggests that any statistically significant disparity should be 
sufficient to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim un-
der Title VII.164 
Second, in Hazelwood School District v. United States, the 
Court stated that a “difference between the expected value and 
the observed number” that “is greater than two or three stand-
ard deviations” will generally be sufficient to infer some sort of 
violation of Title VII.165 As explained above, standard deviations 
 
 161. LINDEMANN, supra note 14, at 124 (quoting Moore v. Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). 
 162. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 163. It is true that Griggs struck down a high school degree requirement 
that disqualified African Americans at a “substantially higher rate than white 
applicants.” Id. at 426 (emphasis added). This, however, was the Court’s de-
scription of the effect of the employment practice in Griggs, not the actual rule 
from Griggs. The fact that a “substantially” discriminatory employment prac-
tice may be sufficient to establish a Title VII violation does not mean that a 
showing of a “substantial” disparity is a necessary part of every disparate im-
pact claim. Further, even if a “substantial” disparity is a necessary part of eve-
ry disparate impact claim, that still leaves unanswered the question of wheth-
er “substantiality” only requires a showing of statistical significance or a 
showing of both statistical and practical significance. 
 164. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424. A Fifth Amendment case, Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), has described Title VII as prohibiting hiring prac-
tices that “disqualif[y] substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks.” Id. 
at 247 (emphasis added). Davis was a Fifth Amendment case, not a Title VII 
case, however, so its statements about the scope of Title VII are dicta. Cf. id. 
at 246–48 (declining to import Title VII standards wholesale into the Court’s 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 165. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977) 
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are a measure of statistical significance, not practical signifi-
cance.166 Hazelwood was a systematic disparate treatment case, 
not a disparate impact case. However, following Hazelwood’s 
lead, many courts have used the same standard deviation test 
to evaluate the statistical significance of disparate impact 
claims.167 
Proponents of a practical significance requirement may 
point out that the Court has described the prima facie test (in 
five cases decided between 1975 and 1988) as requiring the 
plaintiff to prove that the challenged employment practice re-
sulted in a “significant statistical disparity”168 or a “significant 
adverse effect[]” on a protected group169 or otherwise harmed 
the plaintiff in a “significantly different,”170 “significantly great-
er,”171 or “significantly discriminatory” way.172 But none of these 
cases specifically required a showing of practical significance. 
These references to a “significantly” different impact on minori-
ty employees can be read as requiring proof of statistical or 
practical significance. 
Proponents of a practical significance requirement may al-
so point out that a plurality of the Supreme Court stated in 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank that the test for Title VII has “nev-
er been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula.”173 
The same plurality disclaimed exclusive reliance on standard 
deviation analysis and instead urged that “the ‘significance’ or 
‘substantiality’ of numerical disparities” should be evaluated 
“on a case-by-case basis.”174 To the extent that statistical signif-
icance tends to be more of a mathematical concept, and practi-
cal significance tends to be a more flexible approach, this 
statement tends to support a practical significance requirement 
for disparate impact claims. However, these two quotes come 
from Part II-D of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. This part of Jus-
 
(quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977)). 
 166. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2. 
 167. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2014); 
Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 372 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 168. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 169. Id. at 986 (plurality opinion). 
 170. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). 
 171. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585–87 (1979). 
 172. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). 
 173. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994–95. 
 174. Id. at 995 n.3. 
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tice O’Connor’s opinion only commanded four votes175 and thus 
is not controlling.176 
D. THE EEOC’S FOUR-FIFTHS RULE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN 
CONTROLLING DEFERENCE 
Proponents of the practical significance requirement some-
times cite to the EEOC’s four-fifths rule to support their posi-
tion. As discussed above, the EEOC’s four-fifths rule is some-
times used as a rough proxy for practical significance.177 The 
rule itself states that “[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or 
ethnic group which is less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the 
group with the highest rate will generally be . . . evidence of 
adverse impact,” but “[s]maller differences . . . may neverthe-
less constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in 
both statistical and practical terms.”178 In the EEOC’s view, 
then, disparate impact claims require a showing of both statis-
tical and practical significance. 
This interpretation of Title VII, however, should not re-
ceive significant deference from the courts. If Congress has 
“delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules car-
rying the force of law,” and “the agency interpretation . . . was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” courts must give 
Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of the stat-
ute.179 Chevron deference means that courts must defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as the agency’s in-
terpretation is a permissible reading of an ambiguous stat-
ute.180 This is a “highly deferential” standard that requires 
courts to defer even to many agency interpretations with which 
they disagree.181 
 
 175. See id. at 982 (recording that only three Justices joined Parts II.C and 
II.D of Justice O’Connor’s opinion). 
 176. When no one opinion commands a majority of the Court, the control-
ling holding is the position taken by the Justices “who concurred in the judg-
ment[ ] on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977). In Watson, this would have been Justice Stevens’ opinion, not Parts 
II.C and II.D of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. 
 177. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 178. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 179. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 180. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843–44 (1984). 
 181. See Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 51 & n.316 (2006) (noting that there are only a handful of 
cases where the Supreme Court has refused to defer to an agency interpreta-
tion at Step 2 of Chevron). 
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In this case, however, the EEOC does not have “rulemak-
ing authority to interpret the substantive provisions of Title 
VII.”182 It only has congressional authority to issue “procedural 
regulations”183 governing “the administrative stage of discrimi-
nation complaints.”184 This means that the EEOC’s four-fifths 
rule is not entitled to Chevron deference from the courts.185 
Instead, the EEOC’s four-fifths rule is only entitled to 
Skidmore deference.186 This means that it will be followed by 
the courts only in light of “the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”187 The 
EEOC has provided little justification for its four-fifths rule, 
and both scholars and courts have often criticized this rule.188 
At various times, scholars have referred to this test as “suffi-
ciently inflexible and statistically dubious”189 or as an “inappro-
priate benchmark” in cases where not “all groups are equally 
well qualified on average.”190 Courts have also criticized the me-
chanical application of the four-fifths rule to studies with small 
 
 182. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 122 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) 
(citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–46 (1976)). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012). 
 184. Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 185. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Stagi v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2010) (reaching the 
same conclusion specifically in regards to the four-fifths rule); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 760 (2014) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has consistently given only Skidmore defer-
ence to EEOC interpretations). 
 186. See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257. 
 187. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 188. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 
(1988) (observing that this rule “has been criticized on technical grounds”); 
Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 51–52 (1st Cir. 2014) (listing three prob-
lems with the four-fifths rule and citing other circuit court cases that have 
“minimized the importance of the four-fifths rule” or “criticized it directly”). 
 189. Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2157, 2197 n.187 (2013); see also Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal 
Statistical Analysis of the Data in Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder 
Inferences than the U.S. Government’s “Four-Fifths” Rule: An Examination of 
the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L. PROB. & RISK 171, 187–90 
(2009) (comparing the four-fifths rule to other statistical methods and conclud-
ing that “formal statistical analysis of . . . data . . . in disparate impact [cases] 
yields sounder inferences than simply relying on the ‘four-fifths’ rule”). 
 190. Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 
662 (2011). 
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sample sizes that “tend to produce inherently unreliable re-
sults.”191 This is not to say that the four-fifths rule cannot be a 
“helpful rule of thumb” for employers wishing to avoid potential 
Title VII liability without engaging in a more robust statistical 
analysis.192 The fact remains, however, that the four-fifths rule 
has not been persuasively justified by the EEOC or consistently 
followed by the courts.193 As such, the four-fifths rule’s passing 
reference to practical significance should not be given much 
deference from the courts. 
E. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS ESSENTIALLY A TEST OF 
LEGAL/PROXIMATE CAUSATION, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE READ 
INTO THE TEXT OF TITLE VII 
At their core, arguments in favor of a practical significance 
requirement may stem from the belief that the law should not 
impose liability on employers who adopt employment practices 
that unintentionally affect minorities in a small or remote way. 
As a policy matter, this is a reasonable position, as many other 
areas of law distinguish between intentional and unintentional 
wrongdoers and cut off the liability of unintentional wrongdo-
ers for harm that is unforeseeable or otherwise too remote to 
have been proximately caused by the defendant’s behavior. 
Title VII, however, does not include any sort of proximate 
cause requirement.194 All that it requires is for the plaintiff to 
prove that the challenged employment practice “cause[d]” a 
disparate impact on the basis of a protected characteristic.195 As 
discussed above, statistical significance is a better measure 
than practical significance of the correlation between a chal-
lenged employment practice and the alleged effect of that em-
ployment practice on a protected class.196 Although it can never 
prove causation, it can at least measure the likelihood that a 
 
 191. EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Joint Indus. Bd. of the Elec. 
Indus., 164 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 192. Jones, 752 F.3d at 51. 
 193. See cases cited supra note 188. 
 194. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Com-
mon Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that 
courts should not read a proximate cause element into most discrimination 
statutes); Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1199 (2013) (same). 
 195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 196. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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certain disparity is due to something more than random 
chance.197 
F. THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE WAY TO MEASURE PRACTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The main argument against adopting a practical signifi-
cance requirement is the difficulty in coming up with a worka-
ble and consistent way to test for practical significance, apart 
from the four-fifths rule, which has its own problems, as dis-
cussed above. The First Circuit has observed that “the concept 
of practical significance is impossible to define in even a re-
motely precise manner,” and there is no objective or mathemat-
ical way to measure practical significance, apart from the four-
fifths rule.198 As discussed above, those who have attempted to 
define practical significance without relying on the four-fifths 
rule have usually defined practical significance as meaning a 
difference that is “big enough to be important from a practical 
perspective.”199 That formulation is inoffensive but useless. It 
does nothing more than to beg the question. In practice, then, 
despite the superficial attractions of a practical significance re-
quirement, it is extremely difficult to apply it “in any principled 
and predictable manner.”200 
To be fair, this problem is not unique to practical signifi-
cance. Other areas of law also employ flexible, multi-factor 
tests. For example, Skidmore deference has been described as a 
“sliding scale” approach under which the deference owed to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute depends on an ad hoc 
weighing of several factors.201 Other subjects like torts,202 con-
tracts,203 federal jurisdiction,204 or constitutional law205 also reg-
 
 197. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 198. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 199. THOMAS, supra note 49, at 25; discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 200. Jones, 752 F.3d at 53. 
 201. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). See also Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009); Kristin E. 
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Stand-
ard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1259 (2007). 
 202. After all, tort law is the home of the “reasonable person” standard that 
terrorizes thousands of first-year law students every year. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282–283 (1965). 
 203. For example, some courts define “unconscionability” as meaning a 
contract which “is so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the 
mores and business practices of the time and place as to be unenforcible [sic] 
according to its literal terms.” Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 
N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (quoting Mandel v. Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 
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ularly require courts to exercise “reasoned judgment”206 on a 
case-by-case basis. Even statistical significance analysis re-
quires statisticians to pick a certain “significance level” for the 
study.207 
But the current test for practical significance is different. It 
does not just allow the court to engage in “reasoned judg-
ment.”208 Courts have been doing that for years.209 Instead, the 
test for practical significance “begin[s] by begging the ques-
tion.”210 It gives the judge no factors to guide her in making her 
decision. It just asks the judge to decide whether a given dis-
parity is practically significant based on the judge’s “common 
sense.” Because this formulation is practically impossible to 
apply “in any principled and predictable manner,”211 courts 
should not require practical significance in Title VII cases. 
To recap, the text of Title VII only requires a showing of 
“disparate” impact, not a “large” or “practically significant” dis-
parity.212 The legislative history for Title VII does not support a 
practical significance requirement.213 Supreme Court precedent 
is unclear on this question.214 The EEOC has endorsed a practi-
cal significance requirement, but courts need not defer to the 
EEOC’s interpretation of this portion of Title VII.215 Statistical 
significance is a better measure of actual causation than practi-
cal significance.216 And the courts have largely failed to come up 
with a workable definition of practical significance.217 
 
(N.Y. 1951)). 
 204. Even impersonal concepts like justiciability can require courts to 
make judgment calls on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. 
Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013) (extending federal jurisdiction to state law claims that 
necessarily implicate “substantial” federal questions). 
 205. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 986 
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (describing the joint opin-
ion’s “undue burden” test as an “inherently manipulable” standard). 
 206. Id. at 849 ( joint opinion). 
 207. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 208. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 ( joint opinion). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting and concurring in part). 
 211. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 212. See supra Part II.A. 
 213. See supra Part II.B. 
 214. See supra Part II.C. 
 215. See supra Part II.D. 
 216. See supra Part II.E. 
 217. See supra Part II.F. 
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III.  WHAT THEN? THE CASE FOR EVALUATING ONLY 
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OR DEVELOPING A MORE 
CONCRETE TEST FOR PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE   
The courts are split on whether practical significance 
should be required separately from statistical significance. And 
those courts that require some showing of practical significance 
have little guidance to aid them in determining how to measure 
practical significance. This Part proposes two alternative solu-
tions to this issue. Section A suggests that plaintiffs should not 
be required to prove practical significance as part of their pri-
ma facie cases. It suggests that the phrase “disparate impact” 
in Title VII should be read as referring broadly to any statisti-
cal disparity that is statistically significant, regardless of the 
size of that disparity. It also explains how courts can rely on 
other legal doctrines to address the policy concerns behind the 
practical significance requirement. Alternatively, Section B 
suggests that courts can keep the practical significance re-
quirement but address the vagueness issue with that require-
ment by developing a more concrete test for measuring practi-
cal significance. 
A. COURTS SHOULD ABOLISH THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
REQUIREMENT 
This Section makes the case for abolishing the practical 
significance requirement as part of the plaintiff ’s prima facie 
case. This means that disparate impact plaintiffs should be 
able to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact by 
simply showing that a challenged employment practice impacts 
minority employees in a statistically significant way. Subsec-
tion 1 argues that abolishing the practical significance re-
quirement would further the purposes of Title VII. Subsection 2 
explains how the policy concerns embodied in the practical sig-
nificance can be addressed using other existing Title VII rules. 
1. Abolishing the Practical Significance Requirement Would 
Further the Purposes of Title VII 
This Subsection argues that abolishing the practical signif-
icance requirement would further the purposes of Title VII in 
three ways. First, this would help eliminate barriers to em-
ployment opportunity that keep minority applicants and em-
ployees from getting positions for which they are perfectly qual-
ified. Second, to the extent that disparate impact claims are 
justified as a way to “smoke out” hidden discrimination, abol-
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ishing the practical significance requirement would encourage 
hiring based on merit rather than unarticulated (or sometimes 
even unconscious) biases. Third, because statistical significance 
is a more objective measure than practical significance, relying 
solely on statistical significance would make it easier for em-
ployers to comply with Title VII ahead of time to avoid expo-
sure to liability.218 
First, disparate impact theory can help eliminate barriers 
to employment opportunities for all applicants and employees. 
Even if an employment practice does not discriminate on the 
basis of race or gender, it can discourage employers from hiring 
or promoting the most qualified applicants or employees.219 
Consider the case of an employer who refuses to hire anyone 
with a criminal record. A blanket prohibition like this could ad-
versely affect certain racial minorities. To address this prob-
lem, the EEOC issued policy statements in 1987, 1990, and 
2012, encouraging employers to replace categorical bans on hir-
ing convicted offenders with “a more nuanced approach, taking 
into account the nature of the offense, the nature of the position 
sought, and how much time has passed since the conviction.”220 
If courts require plaintiffs to prove that a certain employment 
practice impacts a large number of people, employers will have 
less incentive to eliminate roadblocks to opportunity that only 
affect small numbers of their employees. Conversely, adopting 
a pure statistical significance standard for disparate impact 
claims would help eliminate small but statistically significant 
barriers to employment opportunity for all workers. 
Second, disparate impact theory can help “smoke out” hid-
den discrimination, in both its intentional221 and unintention-
 
 218. This Note takes no position on whether Title VII’s primary purpose 
should be to eliminate barriers to employment opportunity, smoke out hidden 
discrimination, or make it easier for employers to voluntarily comply with its 
provisions. It simply argues that a statistical significance standard would fur-
ther all of these policy goals. 
 219. See generally Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Em-
ployment Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429 (2014) (describing 
how even facially non-discriminatory employment practices can prevent quali-
fied workers from accessing employment opportunities). 
 220. Id. at 1460. 
 221. In the twenty-first century, employers who want to discriminate 
against minorities may use coded language or unnecessarily restrictive em-
ployment requirements to screen out applicants whom they do not wish to 
hire. Cf. Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs 
During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 
613 (2000) (noting that modern racism is often expressed in “coded” form to 
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al222 forms. Abolishing the practical significance requirement as 
part of the plaintiff ’s prima facie case will allow more disparate 
impact claims to survive a motion to dismiss, require more em-
ployers to justify challenged employment practices on the basis 
of business necessity, and root out more cases of hidden dis-
crimination in the process. Hopefully, this process will also help 
employers be more aware of their intentional and unintentional 
biases. 
Third, abolishing the practical significance requirement 
would help employers manage their liability under Title VII. 
Congress did not want Title VII to impose excessive compliance 
costs on employers.223 This was the primary impetus behind 
Congress’s decision to exempt small businesses from Title VII’s 
coverage.224 Practical significance is a slippery (and often circu-
larly defined) concept, whereas statistical significance has a 
generally accepted definition in employment law circles. There-
fore, a pure statistical significance standard would make it eas-
ier for employers to know exactly what Title VII requires. 
2. The Policy Concerns Embodied in the Practical Significance 
Requirement Can Be Addressed Using Other Title VII Rules 
The practical significance requirement does limit the scope 
of disparate impact liability. This can be a good thing insofar as 
it limits government intrusion into private business deci-
sions,225 especially when “very small impacts are unlikely to be 
 
avoid public censure). As Justice Scalia observed in his concurrence in Ricci, a 
disparate impact is “sometimes (though not always) a signal of ” invidious dis-
crimination. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009). Unsurprisingly, 
then, statistical disparities can sometimes be used as evidence of intentional 
discrimination to support a disparate treatment claim. See id. 
 222. Most people have hidden prejudices that even they may not recognize. 
For the seminal work on this problem, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The I, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317 (1987). Disparate impact theory can help address these implicit bias-
es by striking at employer conduct that reflects these unintentional biases. See 
Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision 
and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1, 29, 41–43 (2010). 
 223. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton); id. 
13092–93 (statement of Sen. Morse). 
 224. See id. at 13088 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). 
 225. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015) (“[D]isparate-impact liability must be limited so 
employers and other regulated entities are able to make the practical business 
choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic free-
enterprise system.”); Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 
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the product of intentional discrimination.”226 But courts can lim-
it the scope of disparate impact liability without requiring a 
showing of practical significance for disparate impact claims. 
Three other rules already limit the scope of disparate impact 
liability: (a) the statistical significance requirement; (b) the 
causation requirement; and (c) the business necessity defense. 
a. The First Safeguard—Statistical Significance 
Statistical and practical significance tend to go hand-in-
hand. In most cases, small disparities that are of a “limited 
magnitude” will neither be statistically nor practically signifi-
cant. To the extent that courts believe that small statistical 
disparities should not support disparate impact claims, the sta-
tistical significance requirement should be enough, standing 
alone, to weed out most “limited magnitude” cases.227 Not only 
so, the statistical significance requirement is easier to apply in 
an objective manner than the practical significance require-
ment.228 And the statistical significance requirement may actu-
ally be more effective than the four-fifths rule at weeding out 
small-impact cases in situations with small sample sizes.229 
Any discrepancy between statistical and practical signifi-
cance usually arises only with large sample sizes. In Jones, for 
example, the parties brought suit only after collecting eight 
years of data with “thousands of test results.”230 However, such 
large sample sizes “are often unavailable.”231 Even when such 
large samples are available, the time and expense needed to 
comb through reams of such data should protect employers 
from being sued on a daily basis for every conceivable employ-
ment practice.232 And if a plaintiff is willing to go through this 
trouble to challenge an employment practice that affects hun-
dreds, perhaps even thousands, of similarly situated applicants 
 
1376–77 (2d Cir. 1991) (assuming that disparities that are of a “limited magni-
tude” should not result in disparate impact liability).  
 226. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 227. Jones, 752 F.3d at 53. 
 228. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 229. See supra Part II.C (pointing out the failings of the four-fifths rule in 
this situation). 
 230. Jones, 752 F.3d at 44. 
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or employees, the defendant most likely will be a larger busi-
ness with more resources to defend against the lawsuit.233 
b. The Second Safeguard—Causation 
Disparate impact law requires the plaintiff to prove that a 
specific employment practice caused the alleged disparate im-
pact.234 This requirement “protects defendants from being held 
liable for racial disparities they did not create” and prevents Ti-
tle VII from morphing into a de facto racial quota system.235 It 
also keeps every employment practice from being actionable as 
a disparate impact violation. 
c. The Third Safeguard—The Business Necessity Defense 
Until this point, this Note has focused on the plaintiff ’s 
prima facie disparate impact claim. It is worth noting, however, 
that the employer retains an affirmative defense of business 
necessity. Employment practices that have a disparate impact 
on members of a protected class may nevertheless be permitted 
if they are “consistent with business necessity.”236 This requires, 
in most cases, a case-by-case evaluation of all of the evidence. 
For example, education requirements and height requirements 
may be justified by business necessity in some cases but not in 
others.237 In Jones, the plaintiffs conceded that the police de-
partment had a legitimate purpose in ensuring that its police 
 
 233. This concern with the size of the business being sued reflects the spe-
cial concern for small businesses that Congress codified when it explicitly ex-
empted small businesses from the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (defining the term “employer” to include only 
businesses with fifteen or more employees). 
 234. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B). There is a limited exception that allows all 
employment practices to be analyzed together as one general cause of dispar-
ate impact. 
 235. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642, 653 (1989)). 
 236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to 
job performance, the practice is prohibited.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (striking 
down a height and weight requirement for prison guards when the defendant 
failed to show that there was a correlation between height, weight, and 
strength); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26 (striking down a high school diploma re-
quirement for blue-collar jobs at a power plant because this requirement was 
not “significantly related to successful job performance”). 
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officers did not use illegal drugs.238 The First Circuit thus re-
manded the case to the district court to consider the depart-
ment’s argument that its drug testing program was “consistent 
with business necessity.”239 
B. IF COURTS DO NOT WISH TO ABOLISH THE PRACTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE REQUIREMENT, THEY SHOULD ADOPT A MORE 
CONCRETE TEST FOR MEASURING PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
A less drastic approach would be to keep the practical sig-
nificance requirement as a way for employers to rebut the pre-
sumption that a statistically significant disparity is a “substan-
tial disparity” for the purposes of Title VII. If the courts keep 
the practical significance test, however, they should develop a 
more concrete test for measuring practical significance. This 
would avoid many of the problems with the current formulation 
of practical significance as an ad hoc “I know it when I see it” 
test. 
To that end, this Note lists several factors that courts could 
consider in determining whether a disparity is substantial 
enough to be significant in practical terms.240  
Courts could consider the percentage difference between 
the effects of an employment practice on minority and non-
minority employees. In Jones, for example, where an employ-
ment practice disqualified 1.30% of black employees but only 
0.27% of white employees, there was a 1.03% difference in how 
the employment practice affected black employees.241 
Alternatively, courts could evaluate the same disparity by 
dividing the percentage of affected non-minority employees by 
the percentage of affected minority employees. In Jones, for ex-
ample, the challenged employment practice disqualified almost 
five times as many black employees as white employees, as 
1.30% ÷ 0.27% = 4.81.242 This, incidentally, was how the plain-
tiffs in Jones characterized the statistical disparity. 
Another option would be to look at the absolute percentage 
of individuals affected by the challenged employment practice. 
 
 238. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 54 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 239. Id. at 54–55. 
 240. This list is illustrative only. Brighter minds can debate the relative 
merits of different tests for practical significance. This Note only suggests that 
a multi-factor test for practical significance would be an improvement over a 
circular definition of practical significance. 
 241. Jones, 752 F.3d at 44. 
 242. Id. 
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In Jones, for example, the challenged employment practice dis-
qualified 1.30% of the department’s black officers and cadets.243 
Yet another option would be to consider the absolute num-
ber of individuals affected by the challenged employment prac-
tice. The higher this number, the more practically significant 
the disparity, even if the actual percentage difference of indi-
viduals affected is relatively small. For example, if “a series of 
clinical trials produced statistically significant results suggest-
ing that the survival rates associated with the two treatments 
were 67.2% and 67.3%,” although a difference of 0.1% might 
seem relatively unimportant, “if 1 million people suffer from 
the type of heart disease in question, using the better treat-
ment will save, on average, 1000 lives a year.”244 In Jones, the 
department’s drug testing policy disqualified fifty-five African-
American police officers over an eight-year period.245 
A slightly different approach would be to focus on the qual-
itative nature of a disparate impact rather than its qualitative 
size. After all, in the medical field, “a small percentage increase 
in [the] mild side effects” of a drug would probably be consid-
ered less significant than “the same percentage increase in fa-
talities.”246 In the employment context, courts could similarly 
evaluate the qualitative effect of the challenged employment 
practice. Has it just resulted in some relatively “minor” adverse 
employment action? Or has it had more serious effects, like re-
quiring the outright firing of several minority employees? 
This is a “second-best” solution. This Note primarily argues 
that courts should simply abolish the practical significance re-
quirement and rely on other rules to address the policy con-
cerns behind the practical significance requirement.247 But if a 
court decides not to abolish the practical significance require-
ment, it should consider adopting a set of factors for measuring 
practical significance rather than simply telling district court 
judges to use their “common sense” to determine when a cer-
tain disparity is significant enough to matter.248 That test for 
practical significance is unhelpful.249 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. COPE, supra note 56, at 524. 
 245. Jones, 752 F.3d at 44. 
 246. Id. at 52. 
 247. See supra Part III.A. 
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In short, courts should either abolish the practical signifi-
cance requirement or come up with a more concrete way for 
measuring practical significance. 
  CONCLUSION   
Statistical and practical significance are two distinct con-
cepts. Statistical significance measures the likelihood that a 
statistical anomaly is attributable to something more than 
chance. Practical significance focuses on the size of the ob-
served disparity. Ignoring the distinction between these two 
concepts has obscured the development of disparate impact 
theory and has made it more difficult for judges to apply (and 
employers to comply with) Title VII. 
The circuit courts are split on whether disparate impact 
claims require proof of both statistical and practical signifi-
cance. The Supreme Court has also given very little guidance in 
this area. However, the plain meaning of the term “disparate 
impact” includes any discrepancy between two sets of results 
and thus suggests that any statistically significant disparity 
should satisfy the plaintiffs’ burden of proof on their disparate 
impact claims. The legislative history also indicates that the 
term “disparate impact” was meant to refer to all statistically 
significant disparities, without any additional requirement of 
practical significance. Further, there is no sound, objective 
standard for measuring practical significance, and the concerns 
behind the practical significance can be addressed more con-
sistently and objectively under existing Title VII rules—
specifically, the statistical significance requirement, the causa-
tion requirement, and the business necessity defense. This 
Note thus urges courts to require only proof of statistical signif-
icance in disparate impact claims, putting to rest the fuzzy con-
cept of practical significance that has hitherto plagued our Title 
VII jurisprudence. Courts that insist on keeping the practical 
significance requirement should consider adopting a more con-
crete test for measuring practical significance. 
